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Abstract—Non-negligible amounts of Distributed Generating
Units (DGUs) are already connected to power systems, predom-
inantly to medium- and low-voltage networks. The interaction
between distribution and transmission systems is gaining the
attention of system operators. Given the high controlability of
DGUs, the active distribution networks can potentially support
the transmission system during emergency situations. Previ-
ously proposed voltage emergency controls involving distribution
network assets focused on preserving the transmission system
integrity, even if it implies affecting the distribution system
operation (intrusive schemes). More attention needs to be devoted
to supporting transmission voltages, while preserving the distri-
bution network operation (non-intrusive schemes). This paper
introduces a new adaptive and non-intrusive voltage emergency
control scheme based on the synchronization of DGUs and the
load tap changer of the corresponding distribution transformer.
The conclusions are derived from time-domain simulations using
an extended version of the IEEE Nordic test system for voltage
stability assessment.
Index Terms—Active distribution networks, distributed gener-
ation, emergency control, load voltage reduction, voltage stability.
I. INTRODUCTION
PREVIOUSLY proposed voltage emergency controlschemes focused on preserving the transmission system
integrity, even if it implies affecting or over-using the Dis-
tribution Network (DN) assets. For instance, a commonly
used scheme is the load-side voltage reduction, also known
as conservation voltage reduction [1]. This emergency con-
trol exploits the voltage sensitivity of loads by intentionally
reducing the distribution voltage to a predefined value (e.g.
0.95 pu) in emergency conditions. In this case, the DN is
affected by a predefined voltage reduction in order to alleviate
the transmission system stress. In references [2] and [3], the
effectiveness of reducing the voltage setpoint of the Load Tap
Changers (LTC) of distribution transformers during system
emergencies is illustrated. It is shown that, assuming load
sensitivity to voltage, system instability is avoided when the
distribution voltages in a large enough area are reduced by
5%. The same technique is used in [1] in order to reduce
peak demands and energy consumption.
In Germany, for instance, it is stated in [4] that during volt-
age emergency situations, “it is crucial that the transformers
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of all voltage levels are blocked”. “Furthermore, the voltage in
the distribution networks should be lowered to the permissible
limits.”
In Ref. [5], the main challenges associated with high shares
of Distributed Generating Units (DGUs) are discussed. Voltage
issues under normal operation are highlighted. Furthermore,
[5] discusses different control techniques in active distribution
grids such as local control, decentralized control, distributed
control, and centralized control. The performance of the dif-
ferent techniques is compared in terms of their optimality,
flexibility, need for communication and ability to maintain
adequate load-side voltages. Conversely, this work proposes a
voltage emergency control scheme that focuses on emergency
situations only, complementing the above-mentioned control
techniques. Avoiding a potential system collapse while pre-
serving the adequate DN operation becomes a higher priority
than optimizing resources, in emergency situations.
Due to the increased number of DGUs, there have been
recent efforts towards exploiting their relatively high con-
trolability in order to improve long-term voltage stability.
This is one aspect of the emergence of the so-called Active
Distribution Network (ADN).
References [6] and [7], for instance, study the possibility of
DGUs injecting reactive power after an alarm of potential volt-
age instability is received. It is concluded that, this approach
actually brings along counterproductive effects that may even
precipitate voltage instability. On the contrary, the same studies
emphasize that reducing, or even consuming reactive power
with the DGUs, improves long-term voltage stability in so
far as the load voltage is decreased, thus reducing the load
consumption and alleviating the system stress.
The more severe the system emergency, the more intrusive
the remedial actions. One good example is load shedding,
which is used as the last line of defense against voltage insta-
bility. In reference [8], a load shedding scheme to counteract
voltage instability is proposed. It uses the voltage sensitivity to
reactive power variations as an index to decide the shedding
location and amount that stabilizes the system. In reference
[9], the load shedding scheme relies on a set of distributed
controllers, each monitoring a transmission voltage, control-
ling a group of loads and adjusting its action to the voltage
evolution. In reference [10], the undervoltage load shedding
is based on wide-area monitoring. Voltage sensitivity analysis
is considered to determine the shedding location and amount.
Although those studies focus on minimizing the curtailed load
power, regardless the efforts, this is the most intrusive scheme.
As more DGUs are connected to DNs, the emergency



























Fig. 1. Conceptual diagram of a simple transmission system and an ADN.
attention must be paid to supporting system stability while
preserving the DN integrity. Intrusive actions such as load-side
voltage reduction, may even become detrimental as the number
of DGUs increases due to higher risk of DGU disconnection.
In this paper, a voltage emergency control scheme involving
ADNs is presented. It enhances long-term voltage stability
while avoiding to affect or over-use the DN assets.
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows: Sec-
tion II explains the trade-offs of state-of-the-art voltage emer-
gency controllers with reference to the power space portrait.
Section III details the proposed emergency control scheme.
Sections IV and V present the test systems and the simulation
results, respectively. The most relevant findings of this work
are summarized in Section VI.
II. TRADE-OFFS IN EMERGENCY CONTROL OF
TRANSMISSION VOLTAGE INVOLVING ADNS
Let us consider a DN feeding loads and hosting DGUs,
together with a simple transmission system, as shown in Fig. 1.
Representing the transmission-generation system as a
Thévenin equivalent consisting of a voltage source E behind
a reactance X , the feasible region, i.e. the set of (Pt, Qt)
combinations for which the system can operate in steady state












This is illustrated with the solid or dashed line in Fig. 2,
showing the boundary of the feasible region. A long-term
equilibrium outside the feasible region does not exist [11] and
any attempt of bringing the (Pt, Qt) powers outside this region
results in voltage instability.
Let us now assume that the tripping of one of the two
transmission lines (see Fig. 1) results in voltage instability.
Before the line outage, the power consumption is at the long-
term equilibrium shown with a black dot in Fig. 2, inside the
feasible region bounded by the dashed curve. After the line
outage, the maximum power that the combined transmission-
generation system can supply is reduced. Therefore, the feasi-
ble region shrinks (see solid line). Due to the load sensitivity
to voltage, the power consumption (Pt, Qt) moves to a post-
contingency operating point shown with a circle in Fig. 2.
It should be noted that this is not a long-term equilibrium.
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Fig. 3. Trade-offs of voltage emergency controls.
load dynamics and the emergency control strategy towards
a targeted long-term equilibrium (grey dots). If the latter
dynamics are such that the power consumption tends to be
restored outside the new feasible region, the system will
experience long-term voltage instability. Let us take trajec-
tory 0 in Fig. 2 as an example. This trajectory corresponds
to the natural instability mechanism without any emergency
control. Typically, the LTC attempts to increase Vd, i.e. to
restore the power consumption to its pre-disturbance long-term
equilibrium value, which is infeasible.
Let us now consider an emergency control aimed at coun-
teracting voltage instability. Five such control schemes are
sketched in Fig. 3. Note that they all have the same goal:
increase the transmission voltage Vt. This can be achieved by
decreasing Pt and/or Qt, which, in turn, can be done by:
• reducing the load consumption Pl and Ql, or
• increasing the active power generation Pg , or
• increasing the reactive power generation Qg .
Control 1, the load shedding, is one of the most effective
countermeasures but intrusive, as discussed in the Introduction.
Control 2, the LTC voltage setpoint reduction may not be
sufficient, unless a large reduction of the Vd voltage is applied.
Therefore, it negatively affects the ADN and becomes also an
intrusive scheme. A related technique, Control 3, consists in
freezing the LTC in order to stop the instability mechanism and
avoid a further decrease of transmission voltages. It implies
that the ADN loses its voltage control capability and does not
react to further transmission voltage drops. Controls 2 and 3
are common practices among system operators.
Control 4, used for instance in Refs. [6], [7], consists in
reducing the DGU reactive power injections in order to reduce
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the load-side voltage. Even though it succeeds in decreasing
Pt, the DGUs reduce or may even consume reactive power,
leading to a counterproductive increase of Qt as shown by
trajectory 4 in Fig. 2, along which Pt decreases but Qt
increases. The figure suggests that in some cases the targeted
equilibrium point could leave the feasible region.
Another way of decreasing the power delivered by the
transmission system, is to increase the DGU active power
generation Pg . This is seldom an option, for two reasons: 1)
most DGUs exploiting renewable energy sources operate at
maximum power output, and 2) it relies on the availability of
intermittent energy sources such as solar irradiation. Therefore
it is not considered in this work.
A third option aimed at decreasing the reactive power
delivered by the transmission system consists in increasing
the reactive power Qg injected by the DGUs. This action
effectively reduces Qt, but it leads to an increase of the
load-side voltage Vd, causing an undesired increase of load
consumption that results in a counterproductive increase of Pt.
This is depicted by trajectory 5 in Fig. 2, which corresponds
to a corrective control failure, the targeted equilibrium being
still outside the feasible region. As noticed in Refs. [6], [7],
this counterproductive effect may even precipitate voltage
instability, while making it less predictable.
By way of summary, a desirable trajectory in the power
space is to move away from the border of the feasible region
by reducing Pt and Qt. But reducing Pt implies:
• curtailing load (not desired), or
• significantly reducing load-side voltage (not desired), or
• increasing the active power of DGUs (not an option).
Therefore, a desired trajectory corresponds to decreasing Qt
without significantly affecting the load-side voltage or causing
undesired load restoration. This means moving in a downwards
trajectory as shown in Fig. 2.
III. PROPOSED EMERGENCY CONTROL SCHEME
A. Design criteria
The control actions of the proposed scheme are based
on two input signals: the transmission voltage Vt and the
distribution voltage Vd as depicted in Fig. 1. The outputs are
the reactive power commands for the DGUs and the voltage
setpoint for the transformer LTC. The control is designed to
meet the following characteristics:
1) Non-intrusive. The scheme should support transmission
voltages without exaggeratedly affecting the DN voltages
or over-using its assets.
2) Adaptive. The control should adapt to the severity of
the disturbance at transmission level, i.e. less critical
situations should lead to milder control actions.
3) Local. The scheme should not require a dedicated ex-
change of information with transmission nor between
ADNs (which would be impractical in several respects).
4) The number of inputs should be small to simplify the
implementation.
5) The control should be effective regardless of the transmis-
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Fig. 4. Proposed control scheme in the (Vt, Vd) space.
e.g. short circuit power or voltage sensitivity to reactive
power variations.
6) The control should be effective regardless of the ADN
load characteristics, i.e. type of loads and their depen-
dency to voltage.
B. Control scheme
The control decisions are based on a diagram distinguishing
four operating modes, based on the measured transmission and
distribution voltages. From here on, this diagram is referred
to as the (Vt, Vd) space. It is shown in Fig. 4.
Two control actions are associated to each of the four areas
in the (Vt, Vd) space. The dashed arrows besides the area
numbers denote the expected overall trajectory after applying
the control actions of the corresponding area.
When a potential voltage instability is detected, the control
stores the current values of Vt and Vd. These two voltages at
the moment of alarm will be referred to as V mint and V
max
d
respectively. The objective of the emergency voltage control
is twofold:
(i) the transmission voltage should not fall below its value at
the moment of alarm (Vt > V mint ). V
min
t is considered
as a critical voltage level and efforts are directed towards
staying above this critical value;
(ii) no attempt should be made to rise the distribution voltage
above its value at the moment of alarm (Vd < V maxd ) to
prevent load power from recovering above its value at
that moment.
With this basic premise, let us now analyze each of the four
areas in Fig. 4.
Area 1: when operating inside this area, condition (i) above
is not met. Therefore the following actions are taken:
• freeze the LTC. This stops the load power restoration
responsible for the decrease of Vt;
• increase DGU reactive powers. This is aimed at injecting
reactive power into the transmission grid to raise its
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voltage or at least reduce the reactive power that the
transmission system delivers to the DN. It can be also
seen as power factor improvement at the point of coupling
with transmission.
As a result of these two control actions, the operating point
in the (Vt, Vd) space could move into either Area 2 or Area 4.
Area 2: when operating inside this area, condition (ii) above
is not met. Therefore the following actions are taken:
• freeze the DGU reactive power injection. This puts an end
to the counterproductive effect of load restoration under
the effect of increasing voltage;
• increase the transformer ratio (r in Fig. 1). This reduces
Vd to the desired range (below V maxd ) and favours the
increase of Vt.
The resulting effect is a movement of the operating point
into Area 4.
Area 3: an operating point inside this area means that the
transmission voltage has recovered above V mint + δ. While
beneficial for the transmission system, this has been obtained
at the cost of lowering the DN voltages below V maxd − ε. At
this point, an effort should be made to preserve DN operation.
Consequently, the following two actions are applied:
• freeze the DGU reactive power injection. Since Vt has
recovered a good value, the DGUs should not be over-
used;
• decrease the transformer ratio. This increases Vd to the
desired range. Note that, this could be done with the
DGUs as well, but the LTC is preferred to avoid abusing
the support of DGUs.
The resulting effect is a movement of the operating point
into Area 4.
Area 4: No further action is taken when the operating point
(Vt, Vd) stays inside this “dead zone”. The best location inside
Area 4 is the sub-area defined by V mint < Vt < V
min
t +δ and
V maxd −ε < Vd < V maxd . Indeed, then, the distribution voltage
is just below V maxd (hence, impact on load is minimal) while
the transmission voltage Vt is just above the alarm threshold
V mint (indicating that minimal actions have been taken to
restore the transmission voltage).
One could expect that freezing the transformer ratio and
the DGUs reactive power injections ensures operation inside
Area 4. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Vt and Vd are also
affected by events taking place in other parts of the system.
For instance, the OverExcitation Limiter (OEL) of a nearby
synchronous generator may operate. The generator voltage
being no longer controlled, Vt and Vd will decrease, moving
the operating point into Area 1. If this is the case, the control
actions corresponding to Area 1 are applied again until the
operating point re-enters Area 4. Thus, the control scheme
adapts to the evolving severity of the event.
Note that the voltage sensitivities to reactive power are
different from one DGU to another. This is because of the
DN topology and impedances. Nevertheless, when the emer-
gency control requests reactive power injection, all DGUs in
the ADN support equally. It is generally agreed that in an
emergency situation being optimal is not the main goal. An
emergency controller must act quickly and reliably, even at
the cost of some sub-optimality. The priority is to get the
necessary reactive power support (as close to the demand as
possible).
Note also that there is little risk that the noise affecting
voltage measurements induces misjudgment of the operating
point in the (Vt − Vd) space. Indeed, the relatively low speed
of corrective control allows applying filters to the voltage
measurements. In Refs. [12] and [13], a moving-average filter
was shown to be very effective for the type of dynamics of
concern in this paper.
C. Instability detection
In the best case, the control scheme should be able to detect
the potential voltage instability without the need for an external
alarm. Alternatively, the alarm could be issued by the trans-
mission system operator, taking advantage of wide-area mon-
itoring techniques. A survey of voltage instability detection
methods was provided in [14]. The methods range from mere
monitoring of low voltages to sensitivities computed from a
model fitted to real-time synchrophasor measurements [13].
In this paper, two detection methods are considered. First, the
Local Identification of Voltage Emergency Situations (LIVES)
described in [12] is used. This method uses only Vd and the tap
changes in order to detect a developing voltage instability. The
second method merely consists in comparing the measured
transmission voltage Vt with a minimum threshold.
IV. TEST SYSTEM
The results presented in this paper are based on time-domain
simulations performed on an extended version of the IEEE
Nordic test system for Voltage Stability and Security Assess-
ment, depicted in Fig. 5, detailed in [2] and implemented as
reported in [3].
The extended version is a 1791-bus model and has been
obtained by replacing the 11 loads of the Central area, by
ADNs. A total of 144 ADNs are connected to that region.
Each ADN instance is based on the CIGRE medium-voltage
network with European configuration described in [15]. DGUs
and dynamic loads are considered in each DN as shown in
Fig. 6. The dynamic part of the load models represents 10%
of the total consumption and consists of small residential and
industrial induction motors [16]. The static part is represented













where P0, Q0 and V0 are the initial values of the active power,
reactive power and voltage, respectively. The exponents are
initially set to α = 1 (constant current) and β = 2 (constant
impedance). By modifying these exponents, different voltage
sensitivities of load can be obtained.
As for the DGUs, they supply 20% of the total load










































































Fig. 5. Nordic test system - single line diagram.
model for inverter-based generators is used [17]; its imple-
mentation can be found in [18]. The simplification consists in
omitting: 1) all dynamic components not relevant for long-term
voltage stability analysis (e.g. the fast reactive current injection
during system faults), and 2) all components characteristic of
large plants (such as the plant-level controller). The model is
set to local active and reactive power control as it is common
practice for units dispersed in distribution networks. Active
current is prioritized and the maximum current magnitude is
set to 1.1 pu on the DGU converter base.
The control of distribution transformer LTCs, is detailed in
[2] and [3]. The time delay between consecutive tap operations
has been randomized between 28 and 32 s for the first tap
operation, and between 8 and 12 s for subsequent ones. This
is to avoid unrealistic tap movement synchronization between
the various transformers.
Each load in the central area has been replaced by a number
of ADNs connected in parallel in order to match the original
active power. Shunt compensation has been adjusted to match
the original power factor. Therefore, the power flows in the
transmission grid are left unchanged with respect to [2], [3].
Note that there is a significant voltage drop (of about 5%)
between buses 1 and 6 in the original DN [15] (see Fig. 6).
In order to keep acceptable voltages at all buses, the voltage
setpoint of the distribution transformer LTC has been increased
to 1.05 pu. As a result, all initial voltages inside the ADNs are
between 1.0 and 1.05 pu. The LTC half deadband is 0.01 pu
for all transformers.
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Fig. 6. Active Distribution Network - inspired of [15].
system includes 864 DGUs, 1595 loads with exponential
model and 576 induction motor loads.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Emergency control settings
The moment of alarm, at which V mint and V
max
d are stored,
has been selected according to the two considered detection
methods, i.e. if LIVES detects a developing instability or if Vt
falls below 0.95 pu. Note that such a conservative threshold
would not be acceptable if the control scheme was intrusive
(e.g. load shedding). As the proposed control scheme is non-
intrusive, it can be used as a first line of defense.
As for the parameters ε and δ, the horizontal deadband in
Area 4 should be wide enough so Vd does not “jump” from one
side to the other after a single tap change. Therefore the value
of ε has been set to 0.02 pu, which corresponds to the original
LTC deadband. The vertical deadband can be narrower because
the changes in Vt highly depend on the more continuous DGU
actions. The value of δ has been set to 0.01 pu.
Even though DGUs allow fast control actions, the DGU
reactive power increase rate is intentionally limited in order
to avoid abrupt changes. A rate of increase of 0.01 pu/s on
the DGU MVA base has been considered.
B. Categorization of transmission buses
The proposed emergency scheme exploits the effect that a
reactive power variation by the ADNs connected to a trans-
mission bus has on its voltage. Therefore, before analyzing
the results, it is of interest to characterize the transmission
buses in terms of their voltage sensitivity to reactive power
variations. Consider bus 1044 in Fig. 5 as an example. This
bus is directly connected to the 400 kV network through two
parallel transformers. Hence, it has a relative high short circuit
power compared to other buses in the Central area. As a
consequence, the voltage at bus 1044 is expected to be stiff,
i.e. difficult to raise by means of reactive power variations. On
the other hand, buses such as 1041 (with lower short circuit
power) may be more responsive to reactive power variations.
Note that emergency control actions do not take place
in steady state. Dynamic components such as the OELs of
6
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Fig. 7. Voltage sensitivities to reactive power and short circuit powers.
synchronous generators may have a non negligible impact
when assessing the voltage sensitivity to reactive power. In
order to take those factors into account, separate time-domain
simulations have been carried out. They consist of injecting a
predefined amount of reactive power (e.g. 100 Mvar) into the
bus of concern and observing the resulting voltage increase.
This is illustrated in Fig. 7 showing the time evolution of two
representative voltages. The reactive power injection is applied
when the lowest transmission voltage falls below 0.9 pu,
ensuring that the effect of the relevant components will be
considered. The calculated sensitivities of voltage to reactive
power are shown in Fig. 7b for five buses of the Central area.
The corresponding short circuit powers are also shown. It can
be seen that the voltages at buses 1044 and 1045 are difficult to
influence with reactive power variations (low dV/dQ and high
short circuit power). Buses 1041 and 1042 show the opposite
behavior. This has a significant impact on the results shown
hereafter.
C. Overview of transmission and distribution voltages
The considered disturbance is a solid three-phase fault on
line 4032-4044 (see Fig. 5), cleared in 0.1 s by tripping that
line. This instability scenario is fully documented in [2] (see
“Case A”). Five study cases are investigated as summarized
in Table I. They were selected to highlight the trade-offs of
the various emergency control schemes shown in Fig. 3.
Figure 8 shows the voltage evolutions at buses 1041 (high
sensitivity to reactive power) and bus 1044 (low sensitivity),
respectively. The horizontal dashed line shows V mint , the
transmission voltage at the moment of alarm.
Figure 9 provides examples of distribution voltage evolu-
tions in the stabilized cases. Each subplot shows both the
highest and lowest voltages inside the DN.
D. Case 1
In Case 1, there is no emergency control. Long-term voltage
instability is driven by OELs reducing generator voltage




1 No emergency control
2 LTC voltage setpoint decreased to V maxd and LTC blocked as long as Vt < V
min
t
3 DGUs reactive power increased as long as Vt < V mint
4 Vd reduced by 0.05 pu by decreasing DGU reactive powers and LTC voltage setpoint
5 Proposed emergency control scheme
a) Voltage at bus 1041

















b) Voltage at bus 1044
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Fig. 8. Voltage evolution of buses 1041 and 1044.
E. Case 2
In Case 2, the LTC setpoints are lowered to V maxd , i.e. the
value of Vd at the moment of alarm. Furthermore, the LTCs
are blocked as long as Vt < V mint , where V
min
t is the value of
Vt at the moment of alarm. This somewhat combines controls
2 and 3 in Fig. 3 with the difference that Vd is not lowered
to a predefined value. Case 2 corresponds to Area 1 in Fig. 4,
but without the support of DGUs.
As seen in Fig. 8, the resulting reduction of distribution
voltages is not enough to keep the transmission voltages in
the desired range, above V mint . The instability mechanism is
stopped. However, the reason is not the fact that the voltage
setpoint was slightly lowered, but the fact that the LTC is
blocked if Vt < V mint . The sole reduction of LTC setpoints to
V maxd is not enough to stop the instability. This can be seen
in Fig. 8a as Case 2b. Thus, if the instability is counteracted
by only acting on LTCs, the DN voltages are significantly
7


































Fig. 9. Example of distribution voltage evolution in the stabilized cases.
affected by either blocking the LTC or considerably lowering
its setpoint, e.g. by 5%.
F. Case 3
Case 3 corresponds to control 5 in Fig. 3. More precisely,
the DGUs inject reactive power as long as Vt < V mint in
order to support voltage during the emergency. As seen in
Fig. 8, the system is long-term unstable. Even if the system
degradation does not end up in short-term instability [11] and
all synchronous generators keep synchronism, transmission
voltages settle to totally unacceptable values.
This result confirms that a mere reactive power injection by
the DGUs may have detrimental effects on long-term voltage
stability. This is confirmed by analyzing the trajectory in the
power space, as shown in Fig. 10. This figure refers, as an
example, to the net power of the 14 ADNs connected to bus
1041. The black dot corresponds to the pre-disturbance long-
term equilibrium. The solid circle shows the post-contingency
operating point before the control action and the grey dot
shows the targeted equilibrium after emergency control.
Even though increasing the reactive power injection of
DGUs decreases the net reactive power Qt seen by the
transmission system, it increases the load-side voltage and,
hence, the load consumption. This leads to a counterproductive
increase of Pt, the net active power seen by the transmission
system, and long-term voltage instability cannot be counter-
acted.
Note that for complex systems, such as the one used in
this work and detailed in Section IV, it is impractical to
calculate the actual boundary of the feasible region. However,
the proposed control scheme does not require knowing said
boundary. As explained in Section II, whatever the complexity
of the feasible region, it still holds true that Pt and/or Qt
should be decreased (ideally moving downwards in the load



























Fig. 10. Trajectory in the power space for Case 3 - Net power of the ADNs
connected to bus 1041.
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Fig. 11. Trajectory in the power space for Case 4 - Net power of the ADNs
connected to bus 1044.
G. Case 4
Case 4 is similar to the study in Refs. [6], [7]. It corresponds
to control 4 in Fig. 3, in which the DGUs and the LTCs are
used to reduce Vd by a predefined value, namely 0.05 pu. In
this case, the DGUs decrease or may even consume reactive
power to achieve the load-side voltage reduction.
As seen in Fig. 8, this emergency action stops the instability
mechanism, but the transmission voltages remain below their
values at the moment of alarm. This action is successful
in avoiding voltage instability. Nevertheless, there are two
undesired consequences: 1) the DGUs have to reduce reactive
power injection, increasing the net reactive power seen by
the transmission system, and 2) the distribution voltages are
significantly reduced as seen in Fig. 9b.
The trajectory in the power space is shown in Fig. 11. In
this plot, the net powers of the 20 ADNs connected to bus
1044 are considered. The control action requires the DGUs
to reduce their reactive power injections, which leads to a
counterproductive effect of increasing the total reactive power
seen by the transmission system Qt. This suggests that in
some cases this action could lead to instability if the targeted
equilibrium point leaves the feasible region.
8






















Fig. 12. Trajectory in the power space for Case 5 - Net power of the ADNs
connected to bus 1044.
H. Case 5
Case 5 illustrates the proposed emergency control scheme
detailed in Section III-B. Consider first the voltage of bus
1041. As seen in Fig. 8a, the instability mechanism is stopped
and the transmission voltage recovers (Vt > V mint ). In fact
bus 1041 shows a high sensitivity to reactive power varia-
tions. Therefore, advantage is taken from the reduction of the
reactive power drawn from the transmission system. This can
be observed in Fig. 8a at around t = 100 s.
Consider now the voltage of bus 1044. The trajectory in
the power space is shown in Fig. 12. It shows that the reactive
power support by DGUs, decreases the total reactive power Qt
seen by the transmission system without the counterproductive
effect of increasing the net active power Pt and without
affecting the distribution voltages, as seen in Fig. 9c. As a
result, the operating point in the power space moves in a
downwards trajectory which is definitely preferable to that
shown in Fig. 11.
In this case, the control achieves one goal: the total reactive
power seen by the transmission system is reduced, moving
the operating point away from the border of the feasible
region. Nevertheless, due to its low sensitivity to reactive
power variations, the voltage at bus 1044 remains a little below
the desired value, as seen in Fig. 8b. This does not satisfy
the fifth design criterion in Section III-A. To better meet that
criterion, the control parameters can be adjusted as follows:
• if the bus has low sensitivity to reactive power varia-
tions, decreasing V maxd is beneficial. Priority is given to
exploiting load sensitivity to voltage.
• At buses with high sensitivity to reactive power injection,
increasing V mint promotes the reactive power support by
DGUs.
Figure. 13 shows that reducing V maxd by 0.01 pu and
increasing V mint by 0.005 pu brings all voltages into the
desired ranges.
To make the scenario more severe and validate the sixth
design criterion in Section III-A, the results in Fig. 13 have
been obtained assuming loads less sensitive to voltage. This is
achieved by modifying the exponents α and β in Eqs. 2 and
3. Namely, the exponent α has been reduced from 1.0 to 0.8
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Fig. 13. Results for Case 5b - emergency control scheme accounting for the
transmission voltage stiffness and the lower sensitivity of load to voltage.
and the exponent β from 2.0 to 1.0. Note that the presence
of the motor load yields an effective value of the exponent α
lower than 0.8 for the composite load.
The control is successful regardless of the transmission
voltage stiffness and the lower sensitivity of loads to voltage.
Furthermore, the lowest voltage inside the ADNs is above
0.98 pu which confirms the non-intrusive nature of the pro-
posed control.
Note that the various ADNs are implicitly coordinated
through the transmission voltage signals themselves. Indeed,
when a controller acts, it contributes to increasing the voltages,
which is felt by the controllers monitoring the voltages of
nearby transmission buses. As a result, the latter need not act
so much. Conversely, if a controller cannot contribute signifi-
cantly (f.i. by lack of reactive reserves on its DGUs), it will be
backed up by other controllers acting more. This coordination
through voltage is made possible by the progressive nature of
the controls applied and by the fact that transmission voltages
react “without inertia” (unlike frequency).
I. Limits of the controller non-intrusive nature
In Section V-H, it was shown that the proposed control
scheme can effectively support transmission voltages during
emergencies even for cases of low load sensitivity to voltage.
This is achieved with minimal impact on the distribution
network as seen in Fig. 13.b, thus, showing the non-intrusive
nature of the controller. Nevertheless, as for any scheme, there
are limitations on the controller’s performance that must be
explored. As an example, this section studies a severe case
in which the system is operating under high stress before the
disturbance. This is achieved by:
• setting again the parameters of the exponential load
model to α = 0.8 and β = 1,
• increasing the share of induction motor loads from 10%
to 35% of the total ADN power consumption,
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TABLE II
STUDY CASES FOR THE SEVERE SCENARIO
Case Description
C0 No emergency control
C1 Non-intrusive emergency control
C2 Undervoltage load shedding
C3 Non-intrusive emergency control with back-up load shedding
• correcting the power factor of induction motor loads to
0.97 instead of 1.0.
This leads to a higher pre-disturbance reactive power de-
mand. The synchronous generators operate at higher loading,
but all below 100% of their capacity. The reactive power
demand in the ADNs is higher, which can be interpreted
as a lower power factor seen by the transmission system.
Additionally, the load sensitivity to voltage variations is very
low due to the increased share of induction motor loads and
the parametrization of the exponential load model.
Four study cases are investigated as detailed in Table II. The
simulation results are presented in Figs. 14 and 15.
C0: in this case, no emergency control action is applied.
Long-term voltage instability is driven by OELs reducing
generator voltage support and LTCs trying to restore load
powers [2], [11]. The system collapses in a shorter time,
namely 100 s.
C1: In this case, the proposed control scheme is used. The
controller efforts to bring Vt above its value V mint at the
moment of alarm are unsuccessful. At t ∼= 170 s, the controller
has been trying to restore the transmission voltages without
success for two minutes and 20 seconds. At this point, several
synchronous generators (g5, g6, g7, g11, g12 and g14) have
lost their voltage control capability due to the action of their
OELs. It is at t = 178 s when the system collapses with an
abrupt fall of voltages. The collapse is due to the short-term
dynamics becoming unstable [11] when g8 loses synchronism
a couple of seconds after its OEL acts.
C2: In this case, the proposed emergency control is not acti-
vated. The only countermeasure is undervoltage load shedding.
A simple scheme is used. When the transmission voltage falls
below a threshold, e.g. 0.9 pu, the scheme starts disconnecting
distribution feeders until Vt recovers to at least 0.95 pu (as
in the previous simulations, see Fig. 8). The feeders are
disconnected one by one with a pre-defined delay (typically
5 s). In this case, five feeders at bus 1044 and 4 feeders at
bus 1041 are disconnected to bring Vt to 0.95 pu. A total of
270 MW load is disconnected from the affected area.
C3: In this case, the proposed emergency control is acti-
vated, while an undervoltage load shedding scheme is used
as a backup. After one minute without success in bringing
Vt above V mint , the load shedding scheme is activated. Two
feeders at bus 1044 are disconnected for a total of 60 MW.
Thus, the load shedding scheme disconnects 210 MW less
than in C2, which shows that the proposed controller is still
less intrusive, i.e. the transmission voltages are restored to the
same values with lower impact on the distribution side.

















Loss of short-term dynamics
Load shedding starts
Fig. 14. Voltage evolution at bus 1044 for the severe scenario with and
without load shedding scheme.





























Load restoration due to LTC actions
Fig. 15. Net active power of ADNs connected at bus 1044 for the cases
considering load shedding.
VI. CONCLUSION
A non-intrusive emergency voltage control involving ADNs
has been proposed. The control scheme complies with the
following design criteria:
1) the ADNs are minimally affected in order to support
transmission voltage.
2) The control adapts to the severity of the event. Less
critical situations trigger milder control actions. This
avoids over-using the DSO assets.
3) The control scheme detects the emergency and acts
accordingly without exchanging information outside the
DN.
4) All control actions are based on two local measurements
(voltage at low and high voltage side of the distribution
transformer).
5) The control scheme accommodates various transmission
system characteristics at the ADN point of connection in
terms short circuit power or sensitivity to reactive power
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variations.
6) It also accommodates various load characteristics, i.e.
type of loads and their dependency on voltage variations.
The effectiveness of the controller has been studied for
different cases, including severe conditions of highly stressed
operation before the disturbance. The control scheme limi-
tations in severe situations were discussed. In such cases, it
is concluded that the controller can still support transmission
voltages with lower impact on the distribution network oper-
ation.
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